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Implications of bank ownership for the credit channel of monetary policy transmission: 
Evidence from India 
 
 
 
Abstract: 
 
Many developing and emerging markets have high degrees of state bank ownership. In addition, the 
recent global financial crisis has led to significant state ownership of banking assets in developed 
countries such as the United Kingdom. These observations beg the question of whether the 
effectiveness of monetary policy through a lending channel differs across banks with different 
ownerships.  In this paper, using bank-level data from India, we examine this issue and also test 
whether the reaction of different types of banks (i.e., private, state and foreign) to monetary policy 
changes is different in easy and tight policy regimes. Our results suggest that there are considerable 
differences in the reactions of different types of banks to monetary policy initiatives of the central 
bank and the bank lending channel of monetary policy might be much more effective in a tight money 
period than in an easy money period. We also find differences in impact of monetary policy changes 
on less risky short term and more risky medium term lending We discuss the policy implications of the 
findings. Our results from India are preliminary and further studies are needed to see whether our 
findings can be generalized to emerging economies or developing countries in general.  
 
 
Keywords: bank ownership; credit channel of monetary policy; lending; monetary policy regimes, 
India. 
 
JEL classification: E51, E58, G21, G32 
 
 
 3 
1. Introduction 
The recent financial crisis brought to the fore the debate about the bank lending channel of monetary 
policy transmission. Traditional macroeconomic models such as the IS-LM assume that monetary 
policy affects the real economic activity by changing interest rates which, in turn, affects the 
investment demand of the firms. This line of argument has increasingly come under scrutiny, 
however.
1
 To begin with, there is evidence to suggest that investment decisions of firms are affected 
much more by factors such as cash flows rather than by the cost of borrowing (Bernanke and Gertler, 
1995). Further, evidence suggests that banks are not passive intermediaries between the central bank 
and end users of money such as the firms. For example, in an early discussion of this issue, Bernanke 
and Blinder (1992) demonstrate that the composition of banks’ portfolios change systematically in 
response to monetary policy initiatives. They conclude that the impact of monetary policy on the 
investment of firms is not entirely demand driven, and that at least part of it can be explained by the 
supply side or the bank lending channel. Kashyap and Stein (1993) demonstrate that if a central bank 
pursues tighter monetary policy, there is a decline in the amount of bank loans to firms and 
simultaneously a rise in the issuance of commercial paper, and conclude that contractionary monetary 
policy reduces loan supply. 
 An important issue for us in this paper is that research suggests that there might be significant 
heterogeneity in the reaction of banks to monetary policy initiatives. Peek and Rosengren (1995) argue 
that an important determinant of a bank’s reaction would be its capital-to-asset ratio. If banks find it 
difficult (or expensive) to raise capital, for example, they would be reluctant to lend even if there is 
ample demand for credit in the aftermath of easing of monetary policy. This hypothesis finds 
significant support in the empirical literature. Kishan and Opiela (2000) find that small and 
undercapitalised banks are most affected by monetary policy. Gambacorta (2005) too finds that 
lending of undercapitalized Italian banks is adversely affected by contractionary monetary policy, 
even though lending is not correlated with bank size. Further, there is a directional asymmetry in the 
                                               
1 Theoretically, there have been a number of attempts to extend the IS-LM framework to a multi-asset 
framework with imperfect substitutability among the assets (Brunner and Meltzer, 1963, 1972; Tobin, 1963; 
Brainard, 1964). As such, the lending channel view of monetary policy is a special case of these extended 
frameworks, with money, bonds and loans as three imperfectly substitutable assets (Kashyap and Stein, 1995). 
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impact of monetary policy on the lending behaviour of undercapitalised banks (Kishan and Opiela, 
2006). In the event of contractionary monetary policy, there is a sharp tightening in loan disbursal by 
undercapitalised banks, but in the event of an expansionary monetary policy there is no corresponding 
expansion of credit disbursal.  
 The reaction of banks to monetary policy would also depend on the composition of their 
assets. The traditional or money view of monetary policy transmission assumes that all asset classes 
are perfect substitutes of each other. If, therefore, contractionary monetary policy leads to a reduction 
in deposits, a bank is capable of substituting for this loss of deposits dollar for dollar, using other 
assets like CDs, such that loan supply would not be affected. Stein (1998) argues that, contrary to this 
view, assets included in a bank’s balance sheet are not perfect substitutes. For example, since deposits 
are guaranteed by the FDIC (or its overseas counterpart), while CDs are not, there may be adverse 
selection in the market for CDs, such that banks will not use these instruments to compensate for loss 
of deposits dollar for dollar. This would result in a decline in loan supply. It follows that banks that 
have less liquid assets such that it cannot quickly and costlessly compensate for loss of deposits in the 
event of contractionary monetary policy or, alternatively, those that cannot raise funds quickly to the 
same end, would react more to monetary policy changes. Kashyap and Stein (2000) find that monetary 
policy has greater impact on loan supply of banks with low securities-to-assets ratios. 
 The literature does not, however, examine the impact of bank ownership on the lending 
channel of monetary policy transmission. This is hardly surprising, given that much of the literature is 
based on the United States and Western European experiences,
2
 where private ownership of banks 
overwhelmingly dominates. However, as pointed out by La Porta et al. (2000), state-ownership of 
banks is ubiquitous in much of the world, especially in emerging markets. Indeed, the 2007-09 
financial crisis has led to significant state ownership of banking assets even in developed countries 
such as the United Kingdom, and concerns about the lending activities of the de facto nationalised 
banks have brought into focus the impact of bank ownership on the lending channel in the developed 
                                               
2 See, for example,  the following related recent studies focusing on Western European countries: Altunbaş, 
Fazylov and Molyneux (2002); Huang (2003); Hülsewig, Mayer and Wollmershäuser (2006); De Graeve, De 
Jonghe and Vennet (2007); and  Dovern, Carsten-Patrick and Vilsmeier (In Press) 
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country context as well. In this paper, we address this lacuna in the literature, and examine whether the 
impact of monetary policy on lending differs across banks with different ownerships.  
Studying how bank ownership plays a role in the credit channel of monetary policy 
transmission is important because public sector banks account for a significant portion of the banking 
assets and loan portfolio emerging economies, and, at the same time, many of these countries are 
fiscally constrained such that monetary policy  may be the only instrument available to policy makers 
to induce growth. This indeed is currently the situation in a wide range of developed countries as well. 
Our analysis provides an empirical basis for this policy debate concerning the relative effectiveness of 
monetary policy when a significant proportion of the banking sector is under state ownership.
3
 This is 
one of the key contributions of the paper. Further, by isolating the response of foreign-owned banks, it 
adds to the small but growing literature on the impact of foreign banks on credit growth, especially in 
emerging markets context.  
Our second important contribution is that we separately examine the reaction of different 
types of banks (i.e., private, state and foreign) in easy and tight monetary policy regimes. As 
mentioned earlier, reaction of banks to monetary policy changes may be asymmetric: a change in 
interest rates might have very different outcomes, depending on whether these rates are low or high to 
begin with. If an asymmetry does exist, a greater understanding of the differences in the impact of 
monetary policy in easy and tight money regimes would be imperative for successful monetary policy 
interventions. The richness of our contribution is enhanced by the fact that, for each of these monetary 
policy regimes, we estimate the reaction of the different types of banks based on ownership.  
Finally, we examine whether impact of monetary policy differs with respect to different 
maturities, and hence riskiness, of lending activities. Specifically, we examine the impact of monetary 
policy on disbursal of (more risky) medium term credit and (less risky) short term credit. We estimate 
the impact for tight and easy monetary regimes, and also for the different types of banks.  
                                               
3 Note, for example, the public policy debate in the United Kingdom, an industrialised economy, where two large 
banks are currently in public ownership. The easy monetary stance adopted by the Bank of England has not 
resulted in credit growth to the desired extent, and there is an on-going debate about the role of these 
nationalised banks in delinking expansionary monetary policy and credit growth, at a time when economic 
growth is perhaps of greater importance than inflation targeting.  
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 We use bank-level data from India to examine these issues. We focus on India for several 
reasons. First, India is a fast growing emerging market that embraced the market economy in the early 
nineties and has since liberalised its economy substantially. Importantly, in the absence of a well 
developed market for corporate bonds,
4
 banks are by far the largest source of credit for Indian 
companies,
5
 and hence bank lending plays an important role in the transmission of monetary policy in 
India. Second, the Indian banking sector is also marked by the presence of a number of state-owned 
and private-owned (including foreign) banks, who compete on a level playing field. Third, the state-
owned banks themselves have autonomy regarding lending decisions, and many of them have sold 
shares to private (and even foreign) shareholders, thereby opening themselves up to greater scrutiny. 
Indeed, Indian state-owned banks resemble the de facto nationalised banks of the United Kingdom 
much more closely than state-owned banks in former transition economies of Central and Eastern 
Europe (see, e.g., Bonin and Wachtel, 2002). The state maintains an arms-length relationship with the 
banks in which they have majority (or complete) ownership, such that these banks are autonomous and 
focussed on profitability.
6
 In that respect, the state-owned and privately-owned banks are similar, and 
hence the presumption of profit focus that underlies the analyses of banks in the stylised literature is 
applicable to all Indian banks. There are, nevertheless, important differences between state-owned and 
privately-owned banks in terms of their customer base (Berger et al., 2008), and also in terms of 
factors that affect their lending (Bhaumik and Piesse, 2008). Therefore, there are likely to be 
differences in ways in which the state-owned and privately-owned banks react to monetary policy 
initiatives of India’s central bank, the Reserve Bank of India (RBI). 
 Our results indicate that indicate that banks of different types respond very differently to 
monetary policies in different monetary regimes. State-owned and foreign banks cut back on lending 
following monetary tightening in a tight money regime but domestic private banks do not have a 
significant reaction to this policy initiative. By contrast, when the monetary environment is easy, state-
                                               
4 Corporate bonds account for only 3 percent of the Indian bond market (Asuncion-Mund, 2007). 
5 Domestic credit provided by banking sector increased from 44.1 percent of GDP in 1995 to 64.2 percent of 
GDP in 2007 (Source: World Bank Development Indicators). 
6 The state-owned banks are somewhat less efficient than their privately owned counterparts (Kumbhakar and 
Sarkar, 2003). However, evidence suggests that, contrary to the popular wisdom about state-owned companies, 
ownership does not significantly affect profitability of Indian banks (Sarkar, Sarkar and Bhaumik, 1998; 
Bhaumik and Dimova, 2004). 
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owned and foreign banks either do not respond to monetary tightening, while domestic private banks 
respond by increasing lending. Aside from providing evidence of differences in response to monetary 
policy initiatives across banks of different ownership, and between easy and tight monetary regimes, 
our study also suggests that monetary policy initiatives have different implications for (less risky) 
short term lending and (relatively more risky) medium term lending. Monetary tightening in a tight 
money regime adversely affects both short term and medium term lending, especially by foreign 
banks. But a similar policy initiative in an easy money regime actually increases short term lending, 
without having an effect on medium term lending. We argue that to a significant extent the behaviour 
of the different types of banks in the two different monetary regimes can be explained by their 
closeness to (and hence the extent of informational asymmetry with respect to) their borrower base.  
 The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 provides an overview of the banking 
system and the operation of monetary policy in India. Section 3 explains the empirical methodology 
and the model specification, and discusses the data. The results are discussed in Section 4. Finally, 
Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Banking Sector and Monetary Policy in India 
2.1 Banking Sector 
Independent India inherited a weak financial system. Commercial banks mobilized household savings 
through demand and term deposits, and disbursed the credit primarily to large corporations (Ghosh, 
1988). This lop-sided pattern of credit disbursal, and perhaps a spate of bank failures that reduced the 
number of banks from 566 in 1951 to 90 in 1968, led the government to nationalize the banks in 1969. 
The main thrust of nationalization was social banking, with the stated objective of increasing the 
geographical coverage of the banking system, and extension of credit to the priority sector that 
comprised largely of agriculture, agro-processing, and small-scale industries. This phase of banking in 
India was characterized by administered interest rates, mandatory syndicated lending, and pre-emption 
of the banks’ deposit base by the government in the form of measures like high cash reserve ratio 
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(CRR) and statutory liquidity ratio (SLR). Banks were required to invest a significant proportion of 
their deposits in bonds issued by the government and “approved” (quasi-government) institutions. At 
the same time, between 1969 and 1990, the nationalized banks added over 55,000 branches to their 
network (Sarkar and Agarwal, 1997). 
While the social agenda of the banking sector, measured in terms of geographical and sectoral 
coverage, was arguably a success, the Indian banking sector, about 88 percent of whose assets were 
managed by state-owned banks, was in distress. While the ratio of gross operating profit of the 
scheduled commercial banks rose from 0.8 percent (of assets) in the seventies to 1.5 percent in the 
early nineties, the net profit of the banks declined. More importantly, perhaps, financial repression 
involving state-owned banks was not in harmony with the agenda of real sector reforms that the 
government of India unleashed in the aftermath of the balance of payments crisis of 1991. The RBI, 
therefore, initiated reform of the banking sector in 1992, based on the recommendations of 
Narasimham Committee I (Reddy, 1998). 
Between 1992 and 1997, the CRR was reduced from 15 percent to about 10 percent, and the 
SLR was reduced from 38.5 percent to 25 percent over the same period. The interest rates were 
gradually liberalized. Prior to 1992, the lending rates structure consisted of six categories based on the 
size of advances. During the 1992-94 period, the lending rates structure was rationalised to three 
categories, and in 1994 banks were given the freedom to determine interest rates on all loans 
exceeding 200,000 Indian rupees (INR). By 1998, banks were free to determine the interest rates for 
all loans, with the understanding that the lending rates on loans up to INR 200,000 would not exceed 
the declared prime lending rates (PLR) of the banks. 
Prior to the initiation of reforms, banks were required to refer all loans above a size threshold 
to the RBI for authorization, and formation of a consortium was mandatory for all loans exceeding 
INR 50 million. Bank credit was delivered primarily in the form of cash credit for use as working 
capital, and there were significant restrictions on the ability of banks to deliver term credit for projects. 
Finally, the RBI implemented selective credit controls on “sensitive” commodities.   
In the wake of the reforms, as early as in 1993, the threshold for the mandatory formation of 
consortiums was raised tenfold from INR 50 million to INR 500 million. Further, banks within 
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consortiums were permitted to frame the rules or contractual agreements governing the consortium 
lending. In 1996, selective credit controls on all sensitive commodities except sugar were removed. 
Banks were also allowed much greater flexibility about the proportion of the cash credit component of 
the loans, the new floor being 25 percent. The following year witnessed further elimination of credit 
controls: Banks were no longer subjected to the instructions pertaining to Maximum Permissible Bank 
Finance (MPBF), and were allowed to evolve their own methods for assessing the credit needs of the 
potential borrowers. Further, banks were no longer required to form consortiums to lend in excess of 
INR 500 million, and restrictions on their ability to provide term loan for projects were withdrawn. 
However, prudential regulations required that an individual bank not be over-exposed to any one (or 
group of) creditor(s). 
Finally, in 1998, the RBI initiated the second generation of banking reforms, in keeping with 
the recommendations of Narasimham Committee II. The most important recommendation of the 
Committee was the creation of asset reconstruction companies (ARCs) to simultaneously improve the 
quality of the balance sheets of the banks and to facilitate recovery of loans. In a separate 
development, after a prolonged period of legal disputes, debt recovery tribunals (DRTs) began 
functioning in India, in earnest, by 1999.  
To summarize, by 1996, banks operating in India, were, by and large, in a position to take 
independent decisions on the composition of their asset portfolio, and on the choice of potential 
borrowers. Furthermore, there is evidence to suggest that these banks, including the state-owned ones, 
allocated resources in a way that was consistent with optimization of risk-return tradeoffs. There are, 
however, significant differences across credit market behaviour of banks of different ownership. 
Berger et al. (2008) find that comparative advantage of Indian banks, with respect to relationship with 
potential borrowers, vary considerably with ownership. State-owned banks typically have banking 
relationship with small firms, state-owned firms and rural firms, domestic private banks have 
comparative advantage with respect to opaque closely held firms, and foreign banks have banking 
relationship with large, listed and foreign firms. The likelihood of adverse selection, therefore, varies 
considerably across banks, by ownership type. Bhaumik and Piesse (2008) demonstrate that bank 
ownership also has an impact on risk aversion among Indian banks, with foreign banks being 
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significantly more risk averse than domestic banks. Finally, state-owned banks retained, in principle, 
the ability to raise capital without being exposed to market forces. Since the impact of monetary policy 
on bank lending depends in large measure on the risk of adverse selection the extent of risk aversion of 
banks, and also on their ability to raise affordable capital, we should expect to see considerable 
differences in the impact of such policy on banks of different ownership. 
2.2 Monetary Policy 
The authority to implement monetary policy in India rests with the RBI. It was established under the 
Reserve Bank of India Act of 1934, as a private shareholders’ bank, and was subsequently nationalised 
in 1949. Unlike the Bank of England, which was formally granted independence in 1997, the RBI does 
not have de jure independence from the Government of India. However, with the phasing out of 
automatic monetisation of fiscal deficit by 1997 by way of ad hoc treasury bills, the central bank was 
granted de facto independence. There are strict limits on the ways and means advances by the RBI to 
the government, and the former does not participate in primary market auctions of government 
securities. While the RBI takes into cognizance the federal government’s views about the state of the 
economy, it de facto sets monetary policy independently. 
 Originally, the bank rate and open market operations were the RBI’s instruments of choice for 
conducting monetary policy. In the seventies and eighties, with increased accommodation of the 
federal government’s fiscal policies by the central bank, these instruments lost their efficacy, and the 
cash reserve ratio (CRR) became the primary instrument for conducting monetary policy. In 1998, in 
light of the realisation that in an increasingly complex environment broad money supply in the 
medium term cannot be the sole intermediate target of monetary policy, the RBI formally adopted a 
multifactor approach to monetary policy. This resulted in a focus on the use of short term interest rates 
as the instruments of monetary policy, facilitated by the deregulation of interest rates, which was 
initiated as early as 1989. The bank rate, therefore, made a comeback in 1997-98, and was 
complemented by the rates for reverse repo (and, from 2000-01, repo) transactions. The repo and 
reverse repo rates have emerged as the primary instruments of monetary policy since the turn of the 
century. The CRR, which was reduced steadily from 15 percent in the early nineties to 5 percent by 
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2004, has not completely been abandoned. It is still used in situations that demand significant 
monetary response, or when other monetary policy options have been exhausted. The use of all 
monetary policy instruments of the RBI are summarised in Table 1. 
It is evident from Table 1 that it is difficult to select any one instrument as the indicator of 
monetary policy of the RBI. This poses a problem because empirical analysis requires the use of a 
single monetary policy signal; the US literature on the lending channel of monetary policy focuses on 
changes in the federal funds rate (Kashyap and Stein, 1995, 2000), while the European literature uses 
short-term interest rates (Erhmann et al., 2001) or the refinancing rate (Gambacorta, 2005). 
Fortunately, Indian banks declare their respective prime lending rates (PLR) – the rate at which they 
are prepared to lend to the most credit-worthy borrowers – that is linked to their cost of funds. The 
average PLR of the five largest banks is quoted by the RBI. As evident from Figure 1, movements of 
this average PLR closely replicates movements in the bank rate, and, to a somewhat lesser extent, also 
the repo and reverse repo rates. Hence, we use the average PLR reported by the RBI as the basis for 
our measure of monetary policy. We are not alone in our use of such constructs as the basis for the 
measure for monetary policy. In the British context, Huang (2003) used the average of the base rates 
of selected banks as the indicator of monetary policy, while Hofman and Mizen (2004) eschewed the 
official Bank of England rate in favour of the average of the base rates of four major clearing banks. 
 
3. Methodological issues 
In the traditional IS-LM model, a reduction in money supply is immediately translated into a higher 
equilibrium interest rate in the money market, and this in turn affects the real sector through a 
reduction in investment. On a bank’s balance sheet, a reduction in deposits on the liability side is 
matched by a reduction in the bank’s holding of bonds and loans on the asset side. If bonds are loans 
are perfect substitutes, as in the traditional Keynesian framework, there would be proportionate 
reduction in the bonds and loans portfolios. The impact of monetary policy on the asset composition of 
the banks (and the firms, the borrowers) is of no interest. 
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Now, suppose that bonds and loans are imperfect substitutes. For example, at least some of the 
banks might find it easier to both build up and unwind their loans portfolios than their bonds 
portfolios. In the presence of such imperfections in capital market access, a contractionary monetary 
policy is likely to be followed by a much greater reduction in loan supply than in sale of (or a drop in 
the demand for) bonds.
7
 The literature on the bank lending channel of monetary policy transmission 
takes this change in the asset composition of banks into consideration.  
As discussed earlier in this paper, there can be considerable cross-sectional variation in the 
nature of bank’s reaction to monetary policy. Banks with strong linkages with their corresponding 
borrower pools, with resultant amelioration of the informational asymmetry and hence credit risk, 
might downsize (or reduce the growth of) their loan portfolios less in response to contractionary 
monetary policy than other banks. Similarly, less capitalised banks and smaller banks that find it more 
difficult to raise capital might cut back on lending (or reduce lending growth) far more than larger and 
well-capitalised banks. Since these cross-sectional variations affect only the supply side of the loan 
market – the banks and not the firms that demand credit – they can be used to circumvent 
identification problem of empirical modelling the bank lending channel, i.e., distinguishing between 
the demand and supply side effects of monetary policy on the amount of loans disbursed.  
In keeping with the literature, the theoretical basis for which can be found in Ehrman et al. 
(2003) and Gambacorta and Mistrulli (2004), we model change in loans disbursed by bank i (yi) as a 
function of the change in the monetary policy instrument (MP) – the average PLR of the five largest 
Indian banks in our case. Given the aforementioned cross-sectional heterogeneity in banks’ response 
to monetary policy based on their characteristics, we control for three different bank characteristic in 
our specification, namely, liquidity (LIQ), capitalisation (CAP) and profitability (PROFIT). This is 
consistent with the stylised literature (Gambacorta, 2005; Van den Heuvel, 2007).
8
 In light of the 
                                               
7 Alternatively, if bonds are safer than loans, which is often the case in developing countries where the main 
issuer of bonds are the sovereign governments, a monetary contraction initiated by a central bank might trigger a 
flight to the less risky asset, with banks downsizing their loans portfolios much more aggressively than their 
bonds portfolios (Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist, 1996; Ashcraft and Campello, 2002). This is the so-called 
balance sheet channel of monetary transmission that, together with the bank lending channel, comprises the 
credit channel of monetary policy transmission. 
8 According to Van den Heuvel (2007), changes in bank profitability affects bank lending through the “bank 
capital” channel. According to this view, when bank profits decline, if equity capital is low, and it is costly to 
issue shares, banks may reduce lending. 
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evidence that suggests that bank behaviour in India can be affected by whether or not it is subjected to 
market scrutiny (see Bhaumik and Piesse, 2008), we also include in our specification a dummy 
variable (LISTING) that takes the value 1 if a bank is listed at one of the country’s stock exchanges. 
Finally, in order to further facilitate identification to distinguish between loan demand and loan 
supply, we include industrial growth (IND) that affects the demand for funds much more than banks’ 
behaviour.
9
 
Our base specification, therefore, is as follows: 
 yit =  + MPit-1 + 1CAPi,t-1 + 2LIQi,t-1 + 3PROFITi,t-1 + 4LISTINGi,t 
  + 5INDi,t-1 + i + it        [1] 
where t represents time, i is the bank-specific fixed effect and it is the i.i.d. error term. In the 
literature, bank lending models are usually estimated using quarterly data. Since a change in monetary 
policy in quarter t is likely to affect disbursal in bank loans with at least a one-period lag, yit is 
modelled as a function of monetary policy in the previous four quarters. However, in the Indian 
context, only annual data are available for banks, such that the time unit of analysis is a year, as 
opposed to a quarter. Therefore, we make the reasonable assumption that a change in monetary policy 
in a given year will affect loans disbursal with a lag, in the following year. Hence, we model yit as a 
function of MPi,t-1, the lagged change in the monetary policy instrument. 
 For the empirical analysis, we amend this base specification in three ways. First, since we 
focus on the differences in the reactions of bank with different ownership to monetary policy, we 
interact bank ownership dummies with MPi,t-1. Second, we argue that a given change in interest rates 
cannot have the same impact in a tight and an easy monetary regime; a 50 basis point increase in the 
interest is likely to have a very different impact on loan disbursal when the initial value of the interest 
rate is (say) 8 percent, compared to the case when the initial value of the interest rate is (say) 2 
percent. Hence, we further interact the MPi,t-1 variable with an indicator of the nature of the monetary 
                                               
9 In the literature, the controls for loan demand usually are GDP growth rate and the inflation rate, sometimes 
used together in the specification. However, there is evidence to suggest that in the Indian context bank’s 
behaviour is influenced more by industrial growth than by GDP growth (Bhaumik and Piesse, 2008), and hence 
our choice. We also experimented with specifications that included the inflation rate, in isolation as well as 
together with the industrial growth rate. The coefficient of inflation was never significant, and hence we do not 
report that specification in the paper. 
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regime. In other words, our regression estimates identify the impact of monetary policy on loan 
disbursal for banks of each ownership type, for both the easy and tight monetary regimes. In order to 
facilitate this process further, following Huang (2003), we include in the specification interaction 
between MPi,t-1 and indicators of both these type of regimes: a dummy variable MCI that takes the 
value 1 in an easy monetary regime, and its inverse IMCI that takes the value 1 in a tight monetary 
regime. The resultant specification is as follows: 
 yit = jj(IMCIt-1  MPi,t-1  OWNjit) + jj(MCI t-1  MPi,t-1  OWNjit) + 1CAPi,t-1  
+ 2LIQi,t-1 + 3PROFITi,t-1 + 4LISTINGi, + 5INDi,t-1 + i + it   [2] 
where OWN is a dummy variable capturing type of bank ownership and j is the index of the types of 
bank ownership. In the next section we describe our data set and discuss the empirical findings. 
 
4.  Data and empirical results  
4.1. Data and descriptive statistics 
 The data for the estimation are obtained from a number of sources. Bank balance sheets are 
obtained from the Indian Banks’ Association. Using these financial statements, we are able to measure 
the change in loan disbursal by each bank during each financial year (yit). We measure CAP as the 
log of capital and reserves, LIQ as the log of liquid assets, and PROFIT as the return on assets. The 
information about year of stock exchange listing of banks is obtained from the Prowess database 
marketed by the Centre for Monitoring the Indian Economy. The ownership types of the banks
10
 – 
public sector, old domestic private, new domestic private, and foreign – are obtained from the RBI. As 
mentioned earlier in the paper, the central bank is also the source for our measure of monetary policy. 
We measure MPit as the change in the aforementioned PLR between the beginning and end of a 
                                               
10 The nature of public sector (or state-owned) and foreign banks are easily understood, even though it should be 
noted that private investors own minority shares in a number of public sector banks. The distinction between the 
two types of domestic private banks is more complex. The old domestic private banks were in operation much 
before the initiation of the financial reforms in the early 1990s. They were typically closely held, often by 
members of trading communities. Subsequent to the reforms, many of these banks have floated themselves on 
stock exchanges and have expanded beyond their traditional geographical enclaves. The new private banks came 
into existence after the financial reforms paved the way for market entry for new banks. Many of them have 
links to large former or existing non-bank financial institutions. These de novo banks by and large have 
professional management, almost always are stock exchange listed, and have expanded their shares of the 
deposit and loans markets aggressively. For further details, see Sarkar, Sarkar and Bhaumik (1998) and Bhaumik 
and Dimova (2004). 
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financial year. Finally, the indicators of easy and tight monetary regime are obtained from the 
estimates of monetary conditions index of Kannan et al. (2006). 
We include in our sample banks with at least two branches. This primarily leads to exclusion 
of foreign banks that have a solitary branch in India to finance trading activities of their respective 
client multinationals. We also exclude from our sample banks that experienced very large changes to 
their balance sheets, often on account of acquisition of non-banking assets of other financial 
organisations, or on account of financial distress. Our final sample consists of 58 banks, and the data 
covers the 2000-07 period, resulting in over 300 bank year observations. Of these, 24 are public sector 
banks, 21 are old private sector banks, 3 are new private sector banks and 10 are foreign banks.  
Summary statistics of the variables used in the regression model are reported in Table 2, and 
the following can be observed: First, interestingly, old private domestic banks are much smaller, on 
average, than the new private and foreign banks even though they have operated in India much longer 
than their new competitors. Further, only 47 percent of old private banks are listed on the stock 
exchanges, while 65 percent of even state-owned banks are stock exchange listed. This is consistent 
with the observation, highlighted earlier in the paper, that these old private banks are closely held 
organisations with close links to various business and trading communities. Second, foreign banks are 
much better capitalised than domestic banks. The ratio of capital and reserves to total assets of foreign 
banks (9.3 percent) is nearly double that of state-owned banks (5.1 percent), old private banks (5.7 
percent) and new private banks (5.4 percent). This could imply either that foreign banks are in a better 
position to take risk, or that they are more risk averse. Third, the proportion of lending by way of 
securities such as corporate bonds and debentures is small, and similar across the different types of 
banks. Bonds and debentures account for 10.1 percent of lending of state-owned banks, 12.3 percent 
of lending of old private banks, 13.6 percent of lending of new private banks, and 11.5 percent of 
lending of foreign banks. Finally, the ratio of small-term lending to medium-term lending of state-
owned banks (1.08) and old private banks (1.14), a reasonable proxy for the risk appetite of the banks, 
is much lower than that of new private banks (1.66) and foreign banks (2.90).  
 
4.2. Results and discussion 
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The regression estimates for the basic model are reported in Table 3. The table has to be read as 
follows: we use two different measures of credit disbursed. In columns (1) – (3), the measure for credit 
disbursed is “advances” made by banks to borrowers, while in columns (4) – (6) the measure is the 
sum of advances and “debentures” when the latter includes subscription to both short term securities 
like commercial paper and longer term securities like coupon bonds. Further, aside from estimating 
our model for the entire sample (columns 1 and 4), we separately estimate the model for the public 
sector or state-owned banks (columns 2 and 5) and all non-state sector banks (columns 3 and 6). There 
are 334 bank-year observations for the entire sample, of which 144 are for the public sector banks and 
190 are for our mix of privately-owned banks. Our decision to pool together the different types of 
domestic and foreign private sector banks was based on the small sample size for new domestic banks 
and foreign banks. 
For each of these samples, and for each measure of credit disbursal, equation (2) is estimated 
using fixed effects models that control for time-invariant unobserved characteristics of the banks like 
their relationships with (and the quality of) the borrowers.
11
 The regression statistics reported in the 
last four rows of the table suggest that overall our model specification fits the data reasonably well. 
The F-statistics for all the columns are significant at the 1 percent level, and the pseudo R-square 
values for the regression models are in the 0.23-0.34 range. These R-square values indicate that our 
specification works better for the models that attempt to explain variations in advances alone, as 
opposed to variations in the sum of advances and subscriptions to debentures by the firms. 
Importantly, our results are robust across the choice of the measure of credit and the choice of the 
sample. 
In Table 3, we first report the impact of monetary policy on the growth rate of credit disbursed 
by banks of different types of ownership in a tight money regime. These are the regression coefficients 
i in equation (2). Given that an increase in the interest rate in a tight money regime should lead to a 
decline in credit disbursal, we expect i to be negative. We next report the impact of monetary policy 
                                               
11 We experimented by extending the specification in equation (2) to a dynamic panel framework, adding a 
lagged dependent variable to the list of explanatory variables. The coefficient of the lagged dependent variable 
was insignificant for both the fixed effects estimation and that involving the Arellano-Bond estimator. Hence, we 
dropped the lagged dependent variable from the specification and returned to the specification in equation (2). 
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in the growth rate of credit disbursed by the different types of banks in an easy monetary regime. 
These are the regression coefficients i in equation (2). In an easy money regime, when the interest 
rate level is relatively low, credit disbursal by banks may not be negatively affected by an increase in 
this interest rate. Indeed, if the monetary tightening in an easy money regime signals an attempt by the 
central bank to dampen the speed of expansion in a fast growing real economy, there might actually be 
an increase in borrowing in the near term, in anticipation of further rate rises in the future. Hence, we 
do not have any ex ante expectations about the signs of the estimated i. Finally, we report the 
coefficient estimates of the control variables. 
The regression results suggest that credit disbursal by both public sector banks and foreign 
banks is adversely affected by a tightening in monetary policy in a tight money regime, i.e., i < 0 for i 
 {public sector, foreign}. To begin with, this demonstrates that, contrary to popular wisdom in the 
ownership literature, and in keeping with the literature on the Indian banking sector (Sarkar, Sarkar 
and Bhaumik, 1998; Bhaumik and Dimova, 2004), public sector banks operate on the basis of market 
incentives. The much larger (and negative) response of credit disbursal by the foreign banks to 
monetary tightening, despite the fact that these banks typically have relationship with multinationals 
operating in India and blue chip domestic firms (Berger et al., 2008), demonstrates that these banks are 
quite risk averse when it comes to credit disbursal to emerging market entities. This could be on 
account of the fact that foreign banks often have disadvantages in obtaining and processing 
information about firms in overseas markets, especially when information is costly (Stein, 2002). 
These banks also have a less diversified customer base in the host country and hence are more 
vulnerable to adverse shocks.  
Importantly, credit disbursal by the old and new private sector banks are unaffected by the 
monetary policy action of the central bank. Given the small sample for new private banks, it is 
difficult to draw general conclusions about these banks. But the result for the old private banks 
possibly reflects the informational advantage that these banks have over other types of banks regarding 
their customers; they are less concerned about adverse selection. As demonstrated by Berger et al. 
(2008), most old private banks in India are community based and are concentrated geographically, 
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with a comparative advantage in lending to companies belonging to allied trading and business 
communities.  
The coefficient estimates for i, which capture the impact of monetary policy on credit 
disbursal by banks during easy money periods, are entirely consistent with the estimates for i. During 
easy money periods, a monetary policy induced change in the interest rate has a weak impact on credit 
disbursal by public sector banks (column 4) and none on the disbursal by foreign banks, but there is a 
noticeable increase in the disbursal of credit by old private banks. (Once again, for the reason 
mentioned above, we ignore the coefficient estimate for the new private banks.) In other words, if the 
interest rate is low, monetary tightening does not affect the credit disbursal of banks that are at an 
informational disadvantage – the public sector and foreign banks – because the interest rate is low to 
begin with. However, old private banks for whom the problem of informational asymmetry is not 
acute, lend more, on average, possibly accommodating greater demand for credit in anticipation of 
further rate increases in the future. 
Of the control variables, only two are significant. Capital adequacy and liquidity of banks do 
not have any impact on credit disbursal. This contrasts with the literature on developed countries 
where capital adequacy, in particular, affects bank lending to a significant extent (Thakor, 1996; 
Hancock et al., 1999). Growth of credit disbursal is affected by demand for credit, as captured by 
industrial growth. And lending increased with profitability of private banks, even though profitability 
of public sector banks does not have any impact on credit. Given that our fixed effects model controls 
for the (arguably time invariant) quality of the borrowers, this suggests that private banks lend more if 
they have greater ability to absorb adverse shocks by way of loan defaults. 
Next, we distinguish between less risky short term loans, those with maturity less than one 
year, and medium term loans, those with maturity of 1-3 years. We ignore long term loans because 
they constitute a very small proportion of the loan portfolio of most Indian banks. Since the results 
reported in Table 3 were robust to the measure of credit, for this exercise we use advances as our 
measure of credit. The regression estimates for these models are reported in Table 4. As before, we 
estimate the model for the sample of all banks and sub-samples of public sector and private sector 
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banks. The F-statistics are significant once again, albeit at the 5 percent level. There is also a sharp 
reduction in the pseudo R-square values. However, as we shall see, the results are quite suggestive. 
We find that in a tight money regime a further monetary tightening by the central bank leads 
to a decline in disbursal of both short term and medium term credit by public sector and foreign banks. 
The result is especially strong for foreign banks. Further, the decline in credit disbursal by foreign 
banks is much larger for medium term advances than for short term advances. This is entirely 
consistent with the fact that medium term loans are more risky. Interestingly, while there is a sharp 
contraction of short term advances made by state-owned banks in the tight money regime, there is no 
statistically significant impact on medium term advances. A plausible explanation for this is that the 
pool of borrowers that receive short term credit from state-owned banks is more risky than the pool of 
borrowers that receive medium term credit.
12
 As before, in the easy money regime, a monetary 
tightening leads to an increase in credit disbursed by old private banks. However, the increase in credit 
disbursed is restricted to short term loans; there is no impact on medium term loans. Interestingly, the 
differentiation between short term and medium term advances demonstrates that while the impact of 
monetary tightening in easy money regimes on overall credit disbursal by public sector banks is weak 
or insignificant (see Table 3), such tightening has positive impact on disbursal of short term loans.  
Overall, there is support for the view that monetary tightening by the central bank leads to a 
reduction in credit disbursal by Indian banks, albeit only in tight monetary regimes. Given that public 
sector banks and foreign banks account for over 80 percent of the banking assets (and loan portfolio) 
in India, the bank lending channel of monetary policy transmission in India can be viewed as being 
fairly active during tight monetary regimes. In easy monetary regimes, however, monetary tightening 
can have the perverse effect of increasing credit disbursal. However, much of this increase in credit 
would be in the form of short term loans, thereby limiting its impact on the real sector.  
Importantly, there are significant differences in the reaction of banks of different ownership to 
monetary policy actions of the central bank. Foreign banks are by far the most risk averse. They react 
to monetary tightening during tight money regimes by sharply reducing credit disbursal, and the 
                                               
12 Data permitting, it would be interesting to discover whether this increase in disbursal of medium term credit is 
directed towards public sector enterprises with respect to whom public sector banks may have an informational 
advantage, or whether it is directed to the entire range of borrowers. 
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decline is much greater for riskier medium term loans than for relatively safe short term loans. This is 
in sharp contrast to the behaviour of foreign banks in Latin America where they are much less 
responsive to changes in monetary policy (Arena, Reinhart and Vasquez, 2006). State-owned banks 
also curtail credit during these periods, albeit by a much smaller magnitude, but there is weak evidence 
to suggest that they may actually extend more (short-term) credit following monetary policy tightening 
during easy money regimes. Finally, the old private banks are least risk averse. The impact of 
monetary tightening on their lending is insignificant during tight money regimes, and they actually 
expand (short term) credit following monetary tightening during easy money regimes. This implicit 
ranking of the risk aversion of the different types of banks is consistent with their degree of exposure 
to informational asymmetries vis-a-vis their customer base. The old private banks are most closely 
connected to their borrower base, while foreign banks have the greatest informational disadvantage. 
The public sector banks are arguably somewhere in the middle, with informational advantage with 
respect to public sector enterprises but, given their large and diverse customer base, inevitably with 
informational disadvantage with respect to a section of the borrowers. We discuss the policy 
implications of this in the concluding section. 
 Thus far, we have discussed the direction of change in advances made by the different types of 
banks, under different monetary conditions, tight or easy. How economically meaningful, however, is 
the impact of monetary policy initiatives, wherever statistically significant? Consider the results 
reported in Table 3. The regression coefficients reported in columns (1-3) suggests that a 1 percentage 
point increase in PLR in a tight money regime would reduce advances made by state-owned banks by 
13 percent, and advances made by foreign banks by 38-39 percent.
13
 Given the mean advances 
reported in Table 2, this would indicate a total reduction in advances by approximately INR 5,143 
billion. 
 
5. Conclusions  
                                               
13
 As highlighted by Figure 1, the PLR, our proxy for the policy rate, did not change by more than 1 percentage 
point during the 2001-2007 estimation period. At the same time, India experienced double digit credit growth 
annually, sometimes in excess of 20 percent. These ceteris paribus estimates of banks’ reactions to interest rate 
changes are, therefore, entirely plausible.  
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There is a fairly large literature on the bank lending channel of monetary policy. But much of this 
literature is in the context of the United States, Europe and other developed economies where the 
banks are heterogeneous but are almost entirely in private sector. The emerging market economies, by 
contrast, have their fair share of state-owned banks, such that, in these contexts, the implications of 
ownership for the bank lending channel remains an important, yet largely unexplored, policy 
consideration. In this paper we address this issue, using bank-level data from India.  
Our results suggest that there are considerable differences in the reactions of different types of 
banks to monetary policy initiatives of the central bank. During periods of tight monetary policy, as 
captured by the monetary conditions index, state-owned banks and foreign banks curtail credit in 
response to an increase in interest rate. The reaction of foreign banks is particularly sharp. The 
reactions of the domestic private banks are not statistically significant. By contrast, during easy money 
periods, an increase in interest rates by the central bank leads to an increase in the growth of credit 
disbursed by old private banks, with no significant reactions from other types of banks. The regression 
results also indicate that the adverse reaction to a policy initiated increase in interest rate in a tight 
monetary regime is much greater for medium term borrowing than for short term borrowing. 
 Our results have two significant implications for the literature on bank lending channel. First, 
it suggests that the bank lending channel of monetary policy might be much more effective in a tight 
money period than in an easy money period. In other words, if interest rates are low, then a central 
bank that desires monetary contraction may have to raise the rate substantially to witness an impact on 
money supply through the bank lending channel. This has implications for future analyses of the bank 
lending channel; the condition under which a central bank changes its policy rate should be explicitly 
taken into account. It has also implications for the implementation of monetary policy strategies 
during a business cycle period or economic crisis. For example, if the economy is going through a 
downturn and the authorities try to stimulate the economy towards the recovery zone, then, depending 
upon the type of money regime the economy is in, the policymakers need to consider making 
adjustments in policy rates to get the desired effects. Second, the bank lending channel is likely to 
function much better if the banks have arms length relationship with the borrowers, resulting in 
informational asymmetry between them. If banks are relatively small and closely tied to their borrower 
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base, monetary policy initiatives may have limited impact because the likelihood of adverse selection 
may not increase significantly. This has implications for the post-crisis debate about the size of banks 
and their relationship with borrowers. 
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Table 1. RBI monetary policy operations 
 
Year Bank rate (%) CRR (%) REPO (%)a Reverse REPO (%)b 
 1 April 31 March No. of 
changes 
1 April 31 March No. of 
changes 
1 April 31 March No. of 
changes 
1 April 31 
March 
No. of 
changes 
1996-1997 12 12 0 14 10 7 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
1997-1998 12 10.5 5 10 10.25 5 n.a. n.a. n.a. 4.5** 8 5 
1998-1999 10.5 8 3 10.25 10.5 3 n.a. n.a. n.a. 8 6 5 
1999-2000 8 8 0 10.5 9 3 n.a. n.a. n.a. 6 10 4 
2000-2001 8 7 4 9 8 6 11.5% 9 6 10 6 5 
2001-2002 7 6.5 1 8 5.5 3 9 8 5 6 5 6 
2002-2003 6.5 6.25 1 5.5 4.75 2 8 7 4 5 4.5 1 
2003-2004 6.25 6 1 4.75 4.5 1 6 6 1 4.5 4.75 1 
2004-2005 6 6 0 4.5 5 3 6 6 0 4.75 4.75 0 
2005-2006 n.a. n.a. n.a. 5 5 1 6 6.5 2 4.75 5.5 3 
2006-2007 n.a. n.a. n.a. 5 5.5 1 6.5 7.75 5 5.5 6 2 
Source: RBI Annual Reports 
Note: a Started in June 2000 
b Started on 27 November 1997 
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Table 2. Summary statistics by bank ownership, 2001-2007  
Bank characteristics  State-owned 
banks 
Old private 
banks 
New private 
banks 
Foreign 
banks 
Total assets Mean 52846.43 5313.31 15310.06 11366.03 
 Std. Dev. 75552.61 5057.44 11249.78 12348.29 
Capital and reserves Mean   2712.99   310.97      805.39   1064.45 
 Std. Dev.   3822.87   330.54       698.88   1155.07 
Liquid assets Mean 24919.87 2373.86     6598.75   4110.85 
 Std. Dev. 37765.82 2281.62     4833.27   4398.47 
Advances Mean 23474.70 2539.87     6760.65   5507.03 
 Std. Dev. 32289.41 2612.82     4947.37   6231.61 
Advances, debentures and 
bonds Mean 26117.14 2903.14     7862.60   6227.34 
 Std. Dev. 34877.70 2998.19     5647.44   6825.87 
Short-term advances Mean   8926.75 1083.31     3163.74   3449.37 
 Std. Dev. 12004.92 1121.86     1573.01   3473.09 
Medium-term advances Mean   8206.03    935.35     1962.50   1183.47 
 Std. Dev. 11223.34 1075.81     1998.47   1815.21 
ROA (%) Mean          0.96        0.92           0.17         1.75 
 Std. Dev.          0.78        1.61           3.00         1.85 
Listing on stock exchanges Mean          0.65        0.47           0.67         1.00 
 Std. Dev.          0.47        0.50           0.48         0 
Note: All level variables are in billions of Indian rupees. Liquid assets include cash, balances with RBI and other 
banks, money at call and short notice, government and other approved securities. Short-term means less than 1 
year and medium-term means from 1 year up to 3 years. 
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Table 3. Impact of monetary policy on credit disbursal 
 
Dependent variable: log change in 
advances 
Dependent variable: log change in 
advances and debentures 
 All banks State-owned Private 
sector 
All banks State-
owned 
Private 
sector 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Tight money regime       
Rate change x Public -0.136*** -0.133***  -0.104** -0.119**  
 (0.049) (0.043)  (0.047) (0.045)  
Rate change x Old private -0.046  -0.07 -0.042  -0.049 
 (0.048)  (0.054) (0.044)  (0.054) 
Rate change x New private -0.069  -0.096 -0.111  -0.122 
 (0.186)  (0.196) (0.149)  (0.165) 
Rate change x Foreign -0.383***  -0.399*** -0.32***  -0.324*** 
 (0.082)  (0.088) (0.093)  (0.102) 
Easy regime       
Rate change x Public 0.078 0.049  0.153* 0.174  
 (0.059) (0.058)  (0.081) (0.104)  
Rate change x Old private 0.146**  0.169** 0.165***  0.169** 
 (0.058)  (0.067) (0.056)  (0.067) 
Rate change x New private 0.1  0.063 0.054  0.012 
 (0.277)  (0.242) (0.217)  (0.19) 
Rate change x Foreign 0.06  0.119 0.096  0.127 
 (0.138)  (0.133) (0.144)  (0.137) 
Control variables       
Capital -0.09 -0.434 0.094 -0.095 -0.417 0.054 
 (0.137) (0.255) (0.076) (0.131) (0.245) (0.09) 
Liquidity -0.059 -0.02 -0.066 -0.042 0.015 -0.053 
 (0.059) (0.108) (0.065) (0.054) (0.117) (0.059) 
Return on assets 0.056** 0.026 0.055** 0.054** 0.065 0.052** 
 (0.025) (0.05) (0.026) (0.024) (0.053) (0.025) 
Stock exchange listing -0.008 0.009 0.025 0.011 0.024 0.033 
 (0.023) (0.026) (0.042) (0.023) (0.021) (0.05) 
Industrial growth 0.04*** 0.046*** 0.044*** 0.036*** 0.043*** 0.036*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.012) (0.008) (0.009) (0.013) 
F-statistic 5.97 11.19 2.95 4.43 5 7.74 
Prob(F-stat>0) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
R-square 0.28 0.34 0.32 0.23 0.26 0.28 
No. of observations 334 144 190 334 144 190 
Note:  The values in parentheses are robust standard errors   
***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively 
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Table 4.  Impact of monetary policy on disbursal of short and medium term credit 
 
Dependent variable: log change in 
short term advances 
Dependent variable: log change in 
medium term advances 
 
All banks State-
owned 
Private 
sector 
All banks State-owned Private sector 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Tight money regime       
Rate change x Public -0.171 -0.22*  -0.3** -0.069  
 (0.111) (0.116)  (0.145) (0.133)  
Rate change x Old private -0.092  -0.078 -0.194  -0.353 
 (0.124)  (0.153) (0.2)  (0.26) 
Rate change x New private 0.13  0.141 -0.391  -0.539 
 (0.317)  (0.329) (0.422)  (0.443) 
Rate change x Foreign -0.348***  -0.336** -1.02***  -1.15*** 
 (0.123)  (0.14) (0.345)  (0.347) 
Easy regime       
Rate change x Public 0.142 0.253*  0.367** 0.105  
 (0.095) (0.136)  (0.158) (0.201)  
Rate change x Old private 0.326**  0.307* 0.287  0.446 
 (0.164)  (0.173) (0.343)  (0.371) 
Rate change x New private -0.081  -0.088 0.614  0.623 
 (0.272)  (0.291) (0.522)  (0.48) 
Rate change x Foreign -0.15  -0.141 0.552  0.721 
 (0.449)  (0.514) (0.733)  (0.784) 
Control variables       
Capital -0.008 -0.216 0.018 0.305 0.227** 0.6 
 (0.142) (0.186) (0.222) (0.265) (0.096) (0.408) 
Liquidity 0.02 -0.093 0.031 -0.472** -0.077 -0.517* 
 (0.08) (0.212) (0.08) (0.225) (0.209) (0.256) 
Return on assets 0.062** 0.19* 0.058** -0.027 -0.164 -0.015 
 (0.024) (0.125) (0.024) (0.03) (0.151) (0.028) 
Stock exchange listing -0.051 0.039 -0.2 0.003 -0.298* 0.6 
 (0.11) (0.05) (0.249) (0.248) (0.155) (0.416) 
Industrial growth 0.031** 0.032* 0.029 0.081** 0.045* 0.115** 
 (0.016) (0.019) (0.029) (0.031) 0.029 (0.052) 
F-statistic 2.09 2.78 2.03 3.99 2.39 4.47 
Prob(F-stat>0) 0.03 0.03 0.057 0 0.054 0 
Pseudo R-square 0.1 0.09 0.1 0.1 0.09 0.15 
No. of observations 319 135 184 319 135 184 
Note:  The values in parentheses are robust standard errors   
***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively 
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Figure 1. Movement of prime lending rate and other policy rates
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